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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals of Utah has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (19 88) and Rule 35, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Practice. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1) Did Brown & Root fail to raise the issue* of War drop's 
eligibility for temporary total disability compensation in the 
proceedings before the Industrial Commission, thereby waiving that 
issue for purposes of appeal. 
2) Has the Court of Appeals' decision1 in this matter 
misapprehended the nature of the 1988 amendments to §35-1-99 of the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), thereby misconstruing 
the amendments as "procedural" rather than "substantive". 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Both issues identified above are questions of general law. 
The Court of Appeals will therefore review the issue under a 
"correction of error" standard of review. Morton Int'l v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The statutes determinative of the issues presented by this 
petition for review are: Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99 (1986), 
subsequently amended, Laws 19 88, Ch. 116, §9; Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
99 (1988), repealed and recodified, Laws 1990, ch. 69, §13; Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-98 (1994 Replacement); and Utah Code Ann. §68-3-
1
 The Court of Appeals' initial decision in this matter is 
set forth in full as Exhibit A, attached hereto. 
(1993 Replacement). Each of the foregoing statutes are set forth 
in full in Appendix B, attached hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Brown & Root and its workers' compensation 
insurance carrier, Highland Insurance (referred to jointly as 
"Brown & Root") petitioned for. review of the Industrial 
Commission's award of workers' compensation benefits to Wardrop. 
On October 19, 1995, the Court issued its decision holding the 
Industrial Commission had erred in refusing to apply the 1988 
amendments to §35-1-99 of the Utah Workers Compensation Act 
retroactively to Waldrop's claim. 
On receipt of the Court's decision, the Industrial Commission 
sought and received permission from the Court to file this petition 
for rehearing. 
Facts--Wardrop's Accident and Injury: Brown & Root has 
accepted the findings of fact set forth in the ALJ's decision and 
adopted by the Industrial Commission.2 (Record at page 66) The 
following facts, as set forth in the ALJ's decision, are relevant 
to this petition for rehearing. 
During April 1987, Waldrop injured his right knee while 
working for Brown & Root. (R.54) Wardrop notified Brown & Root of 
his injury and obtained medical care from several physicians over 
a period of several months. (R. 55-57.) Dr. Janeway was the last 
2
 The decisions of the ALJ and the Industrial Commission 
are set forth in full as Exhibits C and D, attached. 
2 
such physician to treat Wardrop, seeing him for the last time on 
March 5, 1988. (R. 57) 
After his last examination of Wardrop, Dr. Janeway advised 
Brown & Root that Wardrop had suffered an anterior cruciate 
ligament injury which would cause continuing knee instability. It 
was Dr. Janeway's opinion- that Wardrop would require a brace or 
reconstructive surgery at some time in the future. (R.58) 
Brown & Root accepted liability for Wardrop's injury and paid 
his medical expenses incurred through 1988, as well as temporary 
total disability compensation. (R. 55; petitioner's brief, p.4) 
Between 19 88 and 1992, Wardrop continued to have pain in his 
right knee. (R. 58) Then, on January 27, 1992, his right knee gave 
way, causing him to fall. (R. 63) Subsequent tests disclosed 
damage to the right knee's anterior cruciate ligament, requiring 
corrective surgery. (R.58) 
During early spring, 1992, Wardrop notified Brown & Root of 
his need for surgery. (R. 58) Brown & Root denied Wardrop's 
request, prompting Wardrop to file an application for hearing with 
the Industrial Commission during May 1993. (R. 1) 
Course of Proceedings Below: After an evidentiary hearing, 
the ALJ awarded medical expenses and temporary total disability 
compensation to Wardrop. (Exhibit C, attached.) 
Brown & Root filed a motion for review with the Industrial 
Commission. Brown & Root raised four points: 1) That Wardrop's 
3 
current injury was not related to his prior industrial accident; 2) 
That Wardrop's claim presented significant medical issues requiring 
referral to a medical panel; 3) That the ALJ erred in refusing to 
allow Brown & Root to cross .examine Wardrop regarding his criminal 
record; and 4) That the 1988 amendments to §35-1-99 of the Act 
snouia De applied retroactively to bar Wardrop's claim for 
additional medical expenses.3 
The Industrial Commission denied each of the four points 
raised by Brown & Root's motion for review and affirmed the 
decision of the ALJ. (Exhibit D, attached) 
Brown & Root then petitioned for appellate review of the 
Industrial Commission's decision, again alleging that the 1988 
amendments to §35-1-99 of the Act barred Wardrop's claim for 
medical expenses and that the medical aspects of Wardrop's claim 
should be referred to a medical panel. In addition, Brown & Root 
raised for the first time the contention that Wardrop was not 
entitled to additional temporary disability compensation. 
(Petitioner's brief, page 12, 13.) 
Brown & Root filed its brief with the Court on February 8, 
1995. It did not serve a copy of its brief on the Industrial 
Commission. On March 26, 1995, after the Industrial Commission's 
time for filing a responsive brief had expired, Brown & Root 
forwarded a photocopy of its brief to the Industrial Commission. 
3
 A full and complete copy of Brown & Root's motion for 
review is set forth in Exhibit E, attached. 
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Thereafter, neither Brown & Root nor Wardrop served any additional 
briefs, motions or other documents on the Industrial Commission. 
However, it appears the Industrial Commission has received the 
Court's interim orders and instructions entered in this matter. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
By failing to raise Wardrop's right to temporary total 
disability compensation as an issue in proceedings before the 
Industrial Commission, Brown & Root has waived that issue on 
appeal. 
The 1988 amendments to §35-1-99 of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act are substantive in nature. The amendments should 
not be applied retroactively to defeat Wardrop's claim for future 
medical expenses. 
The proper application of the 1988 amendments to §35-1-99 is 
an issue of public importance that goes far beyond Wardrop's 
individual claim. The Court deserves the benefit of adequate 
briefing and argument on this issue. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: HAVING FAILED OT RAISE WARDROP'S TEMPORARY 
TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION AS AN ISSUE BEFORE THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT CANNOT RAISE THE 
ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
In this case, Brown & Root's motion for review to the 
Industrial Commission raised four specific issues. The issue of 
Wardrop's temporary total disability compensation was not among the 
issues so raised. Consequently, the Industrial Commission had no 
opportunity to address that* issue. 
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Utah's appellate courts have consistently held that issues 
that could have been raised before an administrative agency, but 
were not, cannot later be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Alvin G. Rhoades Pump Sales v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 
1244, 1249 (Utah 1984); Rekward v. Industrial Commission, 755 P.2d 
166 (Utah App. 1988) . The Court should therefore decline to 
consider on appeal Brown & Root's arguments regarding Wardrop's 
claim to temporary total disability compensation. 
POINT TWO: THE 1988 AMENDMENTS TO §35-1-99 OF THE ACT 
ARE SUBSTANTIVE AND SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. 
The fundamental issue in this proceeding is whether amendments 
to §35-1-99 of the Act can be applied retroactively against 
Wardrop. 
Since at least 189 8, it has been the law in Utah that statutes 
are given only prospective effect, absent some clear legislative 
intent to the contrary: 
Constitutions, as well as statutes, should operate 
prospectively only, unless the words employed show a 
clear intention that they should have a retrospective 
effect. This rule of construction as to statutes should 
always be adhered to, unless there be something on the 
face of the statute putting it beyond doubt that the 
legislature meant it to operate retrospectively. 
Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Sorv, 52 P. 382, 384 (Utah 
1998) . Likewise, Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 (1993 Replacement) 
specifically provides: "No part of these revised statutes is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared." 
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Utah's appellate courts recognized two categories of 
exceptions to the rule prohibiting retroactive application of 
statutes. Statutes which are either purely procedural or 
explanatory of preexisting law may be given retroactive effect. 
State, Dept. of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982) . 
The foregoing rules are - applicable in workers' compensation 
proceedings: 
In workers' compensation cases, we generally apply 
the law existing at the time of injury. . . . However, 
there are exceptions to this rule. If amendments are 
procedural and do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy 
vested or contractual rights, the amended statute may be 
applied retroactively. . . . Furthermore, if the 
amendments (are) remedial in nature, the amendments can 
still be retroactively applied. 
Wicat Systems v. Pellegrini, 771 P.2d 686, 687 (Utah App. 1989) . 
Brown & Root does not contend that the 19 88 amendments to §35-
1-99 of the Act are "remedial". Consequently, the 1988 amendments 
can have retroactive effect only if they are purely procedural. 
Conversely, if the 1988 amendments are substantive, they cannot be 
applied to Wardrop's claim. 
Utah's Workers' Compensation Act imposes an obligation upon 
employers to pay the medical expenses of injured workers. Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-81 (1994 Replacement). Utah's appellate courts 
have consistently held that the employer's obligation for medical 
expenses is ongoing and indefinite: 
. the law is firmly established that, once it is 
determined that there was an industrial accident, there 
is no limitation as to the time during which the medicals 
must continue to be furnished. 
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Kennecott v. Industrial Commission, 597, P.2d 875, 877 (Utah 1979), 
citing Kennecott v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102; see also U.S. Fid. 
& Guar, v. Industrial Commission, 657 Utah 764, 766 (Utah 1983) . 
In the case before the Court, Wardrop suffered his industrial 
accident and injury in 1987. He. gave timely notice of the injury 
to Brown & Root as required by Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99 (19 86) then 
in effect. Brown & Root accepted liability for the injury and paid 
Wardrop's medical expenses. Thus, in 19 87, Wardrop had a 
substantive right to payment of his future medical expenses, 
regardless of when such expenses were incurred. The only 
limitations on his right to payment of future medical expenses were 
that the medical treatment be causally related to his industrial 
accident and reasonably necessary. 
In 19 88, the Utah Legislature amended §35-1-99 of the Act to 
impose a new condition to injured workers' right to payment of 
future medical expenses: 
(2) In nonpermanent total disability cases, an 
employee's medical benefit entitlement, except with 
respect to prosthetic devices, ceases if the employee 
does not incur, and submit to his employer or insurance 
carrier for payment, for a period of three consecutive 
years medical expenses reasonably related to the 
industrial accident. 
The 199 8 amendment changed the substance of an injured 
worker's right to medical benefits by removing that right in cases 
where the worker's injury required treatment less frequently than 
every y/three consecutive year". Thus, the 1988 amendments to §35-
1-99 directly limited the substantive right to payment of future 
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medical expenses that injured workers had previously enjoyed. 
Because the 19 88 amendments to §35-1-99 of the Act are 
substantive, their retroactive application cannot be justified on 
the grounds they are "procedural". Furthermore, there is no 
indication that the legislature intended retroactive application of 
the.1988 amendments. Consequently, the Court should apply the rule 
of construction set forth in Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 (1993 
Replacement): "No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, 
unless expressly so declared." 
CONCLUSION 
In this petition for rehearing, the Industrial Commission has 
identified the misapprehensions of law and fact that may underlie 
the Court's previous decision in this matter. Because Brown & Root 
did not raise the issue of Wardrop's temporary total disability 
during the proceedings before the Industrial Commission, the 
Industrial Commission urges the Court to decline to address that 
issue on appeal. Because the 1988 amendments to §35-1-99 of the 
Act are substantive, the Industrial Commission urges the Court to 
affirm the Industrial Commission's determination that the 1988 
amendments may not apply retroactively to Wardrop's claim arising 
from his 1987 injury. 
The issues presented by this case are of great significance to 
all the participants in the workers' compensation system. 
Unfortunately, errors and oversights by all the parties prevented 
the Court from receiving the benefit of appropriate briefing and' 
9 
argument. The Industrial Commission respectfully requests that the 
Court instruct the parties to submit additional briefs, then set 
this matter for oral argument. 
Dated this 20th day of November,.1995. 
Alan Hennebold (4740) 
General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
10 
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EXHIBIT A: 
INITIAL DECISION, UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BROWN & ROOT V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CASE NO. 940652-CA; Filed October 19, 1995 
1 i B— 3—8-/ 
OCT 1 9 1995 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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Brown & Root Industrial 




Industrial Commission of Utah, 
and David Wardrop, 
Respondents. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 940652-CA 
F I L E D 
(Oc tober 1 9 , 1995) 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Attorneys: Stuart L. Poelman and Julianne P. Blanch, Salt Lake 
City, for Petitioners 
G. Scott Jensen, Ogden, for Respondent David Wardrop 
Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Billings. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Brown & Root Industrial Service (Brown & Root) and its 
insurer appeal the Industrial Commission's award of medical 
expenses and temporary disability compensation to David Wardrop. 
We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
Wardrop was injured at a work site in April 1987 while 
employed by Brown & Root. Wardrop visited several physicians, 
underwent surgery, and received treatments for which Brown & Root 
paid the medical bills. Wardrop's employment with Brown & Root 
ended later in 1987. Wardrop submitted his last medical bill 
related to this accident in 1988. 
In 1992, Wardrop reinjured his knee in a nonindustrial slip-
and-fall accident. Wardrop sought coverage from Brown & Root for 
surgery and rehabilitation, claiming that his 1992 injury was 
causally related to his 1987 industrial accident. Brown & Root 
EXHIBIT A, PAGE ONE 
refused to cover Wardrop's injury and, in May 1993, Wardrop filed 
a claim with the Industrial Commission. 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that because 
section 35-1-99 of the Utah Code was amended after Wardrop's 
initial industrial injury, it could not be applied to bar 
Wardrop's claim. The ALJ determined that Wardrop's 1992 injury 
was a "natural consequence" of the 1987 industrial injury, and 
ordered Brown & Root to pay workers' compensation benefits for 
the 1992 injury. Brown & Root filed a motion for review with the 
Industrial Commission. The Industrial Commission denied Brown & 
Root's motion for review, and affirmed the ALJ's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
ANALYSIS 
Brown & Root claims that the Industrial Commission erred by 
determining that the applicable statute in this case was the 1986 
version of section 35-1-99, which was in effect at the time 
Wardrop was initially injured.1 Whether to give retroactive 
effect to an amended statute of limitations is a question of 
general law when "the [commission's] experience or expertise is 
not helpful in resolving the issue." Morton Int'l Inc. v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 1991). We therefore review 
the Industrial Commission's determination under a correction of 
error standard. See Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 853 n.2 
(Utah 1992) (stating when "there is no explicit delegation of 
discretion, and the issues are questions . . . on which the 
Commission's experience and expertise will be of no real 
assistance" then no deference given to commission). 
The 1986 statute provided, in pertinent part, that "[i]f no 
claim for compensation is filed with the Industrial Commission 
within three years after the date of the accident or the date of 
the last payment of compensation, the right to compensation is 
wholly barred." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (Supp. 1986). At that 
time, the statutory term "compensation" did not include medical 
expenses. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 597 
P.2d 875, 877-78 (Utah 1979). Therefore, "the three year statute 
of limitations set forth in section 35-1-99 did not bar the 
recovery of medical expenses." Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 740 P. 2d 305, 310 (Utah App. 1987) . Thus, according to 
the Industrial Commission's conclusion, since medical expenses 
1. Brown & Root also claims that the Industrial Commission erred 
in not convening a medical panel to review the physicians' 
conflicting medical opinions. In light of the disposition of 
this case, we need not reach this issue. 
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were not considered compensation under the 1986 statute in effect 
at the time of Wardrop's initial claim, it followed that the 
statute did not limit his claim against Brown & Root for medical 
expenses under his 1993 claim. Consequently, the Industrial 
Commission held that Brown & Root was liable for medical expenses 
incurred by Wardrop after his nonindustrial injury. 
In 1988, the legislature amended section 35-1-99 and 
expressly expanded the statute to encompass medical expenses. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(2) (1988) stated in part, that "[i]n 
nonpermanent total disability cases, an employees's medical 
benefit entitlement . . . ceases if the employee does not incur, 
and submit to his employer or insurance carrier for payment, for 
a period of three consecutive years, medical expenses reasonably 
related to the industrial accident."2 Brown & Root arguBs that 
the 1988 amendment should be applied retroactively to bar 
Wardrop's application for benefits. The Industrial Commission 
held that the 1988 amendment could not apply to Wardrop's claim, 
concluding that "it is well settled that the law in effect at the 
time of the accident governs the substantive rights of the 
parties." 
Generally, an amendment to a statute will not be given 
retroactive effect. However, statutes that affect procedural 
rights rather than substantive rights are generally applied 
retroactively. State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 475 (Utah App. 
1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). Section 35-1-
99(2) has been held to be a statute of limitations. See Avis v. 
Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1992), cert. 
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). Statutes of limitation are 
generally considered to affect only procedural rights. Financial 
Bancorp, Inc. v. Pingree & Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 
App. 1994). Accordingly, the 1988 amendment bars Wardrop's claim 
against Brown & Root for medical expenses. 
Similarly, the statute of limitations in section 35-1-98(2) 
bars Wardrop from claiming total temporary disability benefits. 
It requires a claimant to file an application for a hearing "with 
the commission within six years after the date of the 
[industrial] accident." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-98(2) (1994). 
Wardrop's industrial accident occurred in April, 1987, and he 
filed his claim in May 1993, over six years after the accident. 
Thus, his claim for temporary total disability benefits was 
untimely filed. 
2. Section 35-1-99 was repealed entirely in 1990 and its 
relevant provisions were incorporated into Utah Code Ann. § 3 5-1-
98(1) (1994) . 
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We therefore reverse the award of benefits-
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
I DISSENT: 
Gregorv^iCT Orme^ Presiding Judge 
f£U**&£(' 
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COVER SHEET 
CASE TITLE: 
Brown & Root Industrial Service 
and Highland Insurance, 
Petitioners, 
v. Case No. 940652-CA 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 
and David Wardrop, 
Respondents. 
October 19, 1995. OPINION (For Official Publication). 
Opinion of the Court by RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge; GREGORY K. ORME, 
Presiding Judge, dissents; and JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge, concurs. 
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EXHIBIT B: 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Ann, (1986) amended Laws 1988/ ch. 116, 
§9: 
When an employee claiming to have suffered an injury in the service 
of his employer fails to give notice to his employer of the time 
and place where the accident and injury occurred, and of the nature 
of the accident and injury, within 48 hours, when possible, or 
fails to report for medical treatment within that time, the 
compensation provided for herein shall be reduced by 15%; provided, 
that knowledge of the injury obtained from any source on the part 
of the- employer, his managing agent, superintendent, foreman, or 
other person" in authority, or knowledge of any assertion by the 
injured sufficient to afford an opportunity to the employer to make 
an investigation into the facts and to provide medical treatment is 
equivalent to this notice; and no defect or inaccuracy in the 
notice subjects the claimant to this reduction, if there was no 
intention to mislead or prejudice the employer in making his 
defense, and the employer was not, in fact, so misled or 
prejudiced. If no notice of the accident and injury is given to 
the employer within one year after the date of the accident, the 
right to compensation is wholly barred. If no claim for 
compensation is filed with the Industrial Commission within three 
years after the date of the accident or the date of the last 
payment of compensation, the right to compensation is wholly 
barred. However, the filing of a report or notice of accident or 
injury with the Industrial Commission, the employer, or its 
insurance carrier, together with the payment of any compensation 
benefit or the furnishing of medical treatment by the employer or 
an insurance carrier, tolls the period for filing the claim until 
the employer or its carrier notifies the employee, in writing, of 
its denial of liability or further liability for the industrial 
accident or injury, with instructions upon the notification of 
denial to the employee to contact the Industrial Commission for 
further advice or assistance to preserve or protect the employee's 
rights. The claim for compensation in any event shall be filed 
within 8 years after the date of the accident. 
Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Ann. (1988) repealed and recodified Laws 
1990, ch. 69, §13: 
(1) If an employee claiming to have suffered an industrial accident 
in the service of his employer fails to give written notice within 
180 calendar days to his employer or the commission of the time and 
place where the accident and injury occurred, and of the nature of 
the accident and injury, the employee's claim for benefits under 
this chapter is wholly barred. If, for any reason, an employee is 
himself unable to provide this written notice, the employee's next-
of-kin or attorney may file it within the required 180-day period. 
Receipt of written notice is presumed if the employer complies with 
the terms of Section 35-1-97 by filing with the commission an 
accident report, or if the employer or its insurance carrier pays 
disability or medical benefits to or on behalf of the injured 
employee. 
APPENDIX B, PAGE ONE 
Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Ann, (1988) cont. 
(2) In nonpermanent total disability cases, an employee's 
medical benefit entitlement, except with respect to prosthetic 
devices, ceases if the employee does not incur, and submit to his 
employer or insurance carrier for payment, for a period of three 
consecutive years medical expenses reasonably related to the 
industr ial accident. 
(3) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability 
benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, permanent partial 
disability benefits, or permanent total disability benefits is 
wholly barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the 
Industrial Commission within six years after the date of the 
accident. 
(4) A claim for death benefits is wholly barred, unless an 
application for hearing is filed within one year of the date of 
death of the employee. 
35-1-98. Claims and benefits (1994 Replacement) 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent 
total disability cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement 
ceases if the employee does not incur medical expenses reasonably 
related to the industrial accident, and submit those expenses to 
his employer or insurance carrier for payment, for a period of 
three consecutive years. 
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability 
benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, permanent partial 
disability benefits, or permanent total disability benefits is 
barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the 
commission within six years after the date of the accident. 
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an application 
for hearing is filed within one year of the date of death of the 
employee. 
68-3-3, Retroactive effect (1993 Replacement) 
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared. 
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Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
January 31, 1994 at 10:00 o'clock a.m. Said 
hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and was represented by G. 
Scott Jensen, Attorney. 
The defendants were represented by Stuart Poleman, 
Attorney. 
This case involves a claim for benefits associated with a 
proposed surgery on the applicant's right knee. The applicant 
claims that the cause of the need for the surgery is an April 23, 
1987 industrial right knee injury. The adjustor originally 
accepted liability for the knee injury and paid medical expenses 
and temporary total compensation (TTC) from July 14, 1987 through 
July 27, 1987 while the applicant recovered from an arthroscopic 
surgery on the right knee. Payment of medical expenses continued 
through some time in 1988 and then no further medical expenses were 
incurred until 1992. The adjustor declined to pay further expenses 
in 1992 because: 1) the applicant went more .than 3 years without 
incurring or submitting related medical expenses and per the 
current reading of U.C.A. 35-1-98(1) this causes the applicant's 
medical benefit entitlement to cease and 2) the applicant sustained 
a subsequent non-industrial injury that caused aggravation to the 
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The applicant's testimony was taken at the hearing and a 
medical record exhibit (Exhibit D-l) was entered into evidence at 
that time. Other exhibits entered into evidence at the hearing 
include: Exhibit D-2 (the employer's first report of work injury) 
and Exhibit D-3 (a written notarized statement apparently signed by 
the applicant's prior employer in Colorado). At the close of the 
hearing, counsel for the defendants indicated that he wanted to 
submit an audio tape of the applicant's recorded statement taken by 
the adjustor in June of 1987. Counsel for the applicant objected 
to admitting the tape. The ALJ indicated that counsel for the 
defendant should have a written transcript of the tape prepared 
post-hearing and should provide the applicant and his attorney with 
a copy of the transcript. After counsel for the applicant reviewed 
the transcript, the ALJ determined that he would be allowed to 
submit to the ALJ any objections he had to the admission of the 
transcript and could request a second hearing for cross examination 
of the adjustor who recorded the statement. On February 9, 1994, 
counsel for the defendants wrote the ALJ and indicated that he had 
decided not to request admission of the audio tape or a transcript 
of the tape. As such, the ALJ wrote counsel for the applicant on 
February 23, 1994 and indicated that she would consider the matter 
ready for order as of the date that counsel for the defendants' 
letter arrived at the Commission (February 9, 1994). 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant is a male who was 24 years old on the date of 
injury, April 23, 1987, and who had no spouse at that time, but had 
one minor child dependent upon him for support. The applicant was 
working for Brown & Root Industrial Service (also listed as Brown 
& Root Construction or Brown & Root USA) as a laborer on April 23, 
1987 and had been so employed for 3 weeks on the date of injury. 
The applicant was working 40 hours per week and was earning either 
?5.50/hour or $5.63/hour at that time. The applicant testified 
that on April 23, 1987, he was working on building a burn plant and 
/as assigned to clean mud and water out of a pit so that a sump 
Dump could be installed. The applicant explained that the laborers 
/ere using 5-gallon buckets to transfer the mud and water up out of 
-Jtie pit. The applicant estimated that the pit was 10 to 12 feet 
leep and he indicated that he had to use a rope to get down into 
•Jtie pit. At one point, £he applicant was climbing up out of the 
>it using the rope, and he slipped and fell back into the pit, 
.anding with his right,leg on top of an overturned 5-gallon bucket. 
'he applicant stated that this fall jarred the knee and caused it 
C\{\ 1 
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to pop. He stated that it was painful for a while, but he managed 
to complete his shift that day. The applicant recalls that he 
reported the injury to his supervisor before leaving work and also 
spoke to him on the phone after he got home. 
The applicant continued to work, doing his normal duties 
after the date of injury. Then, apparently on May 4, 1987, the 
applicant was throwing a large box up into a dumpster and the right 
knee "locked" on him. Apparently, his supervisor took him to 
Tanner Memorial Clinic, in Layton, Utah, on that day, Snd the 
applicant was seen by Dr. P. Taylor, a family practitioner. Dr. 
Taylor/s office note describes the original injury on April 23, 
1987 and diagnoses a right knee strain. Dr. Taylor found no 
specific point tenderness, but did note discomfort along the 
medical collateral ligament. A knee X-ray was read as normal. Dr. 
Taylor determined that the applicant could return to work right 
away, with no running, jumping or heavy lifting. Once again, the 
applicant returned to work, apparently for another 3 weeks, and 
then he decided to to get a second opinion regarding his knee from 
Dr. C. Bean, an orthopedist at the Tanner Memorial Clinic. 
The applicant saw Dr. Bean on May 28, 1987 and his office 
note of that date indicates that the applicant had persistent pain 
and stiffness after the initial injury and had persistent medical 
joint pain and repeated minor strains after the box throwing 
incident. Dr. Bean/s diagnostic impression was: 1) torn medial 
meniscus and 2) torn anterior cruciate, partial v. complete tear. 
He recommended light duty and prescribed tolectin. He noted that 
if there was no improvement within the next 6 weeks, he would 
recommend arthroscopic surgery. The applicant testified at hearing 
that when he requested light duty with Brown & Root, he was 
terminated. 
After seeing Dr. Bean, the applicant apparently contacted 
the adjustor and he testified at hearing that the adjustor agreed 
to send him to Dr. C. Gabbert, an orthopedic surgeon in Ogden, 
Utah. Dr. Gabbert saw the applicant on July 1, 1987, and he noted 
that the discomfort that the applicant had at that time was on the 
medical aspect of the knee. He noted that the applicant had had 3 
or 4 episodes of locking, where it was necessary to massage the 
knee in order to get it to straighten out. He also noted that the 
applicant had a feeling of instability in the knee and that it was 
bothersome going up and down stairs. Dr. Gabbert diagnosed a 
probable torn meniscus and he recommended arthroscopic surgery. 
rxrv^ r^tr 
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The surgery Was performed at McKay Dee Hospital on July 14, 1987. 
The operative report indicates that no lateral or medial meniscus 
tears were found and that the anterior cruciate ligament was in 
tact. The post-operative diagnosis was: no pathology found. 
The applicant testified that he continued to have the 
locking problems post-surgery and even fell down once when he tried 
to stand up from a sitting position and the knee locked. He stated 
that Dr. Gabbert did not prescribe any kind of exercises for the 
knee and did not tell him to restrict his activities in any way. 
Dr. Gabbert's July 23, 1987 office note indicates that the 
applicant was progressing satisfactorily and that the applicant was 
released to return to work on July 27, 1987. "However, when he saw 
him again on August 19, 1987, he noted that the applicant was still 
having some discomfort, especially when working with torque or when 
he kneeled directly on the knee. Dr. Gabbert noted that the 
applicant could walk without any noticeable problem, that he had no 
swelling or ligamentous instability, that he had full range of 
motion and that he had good quad function. At that point, his 
office note indicates that he recommended isometric quad 
strengthening for what he considered to be subjective knee 
discomfort of uncertain etiology. On September 21, 1987, Dr. 
Gabbert wrote the adjustor and indicated that he anticipated no 
permanent impairment to the right knee. 
Per the applicants testimony, he spoke with the adjustor 
again in late September or early October of 1987. The applicant 
testified that the adjustor allowed him to select another 
specialist for consultation, as he was still having problems with 
the right knee. The applicant saw Dr. L. M. Janeway, an 
orthopedist at Ogden Clinic on October 28, 1987. There is a 
handwritten office note for that date and a Physician's Initial 
Report of Work Injury form. The office note is mostly illegible, 
out the form indicates that the applicant had mild joint effusion, 
aild anterior cruciate ligament laxity and medial joint tenderness, 
issociated with an April 1987 fall into a sump pump hole. The 
liagnosis indicated on the form is: disruption of right knee 
interior cruciate ligament. The form indicates that Dr. Janeway' 
:elt that the knee required further evaluation and probable 
surgery. Dr. Janeway's office note indicates that the applicant 
lid not show up'for his next appointment on November 6, 1987. The 
ipplicant testified at hearing that.Dr. Janeway told him he should 
on '^ c^  
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just do exercises and that he might need surgery in the future. He 
stated that Dr. Janeway told him that the knee would get worse, but 
that he could hold off on the surgery, because the knee was not 
that bad at that time. It is unclear what the applicant did 
between late October 1987 and March of 1988. 
On March 5, 1988, Dr. Janeway saw the applicant again and 
wrote the adjustor. In that letter, Dr. Janeway notes that the 
applicant's right knee was still painful, especially with attempts 
at increased activity. He notes the applicant's symptoms to 
include knee pain and thigh numbness with prolonged sitting and 
occasional locking with increased pain going up and down stairs. 
Dr. Janeway notes that, at that time, he prescribed feldene and 
instructed the applicant to return to him in one week for further 
evaluation. The letter to the adjustor notes that Dr. Janeway 
believed that the applicant had an anterior cruciate ligament 
injury which would continue to stretch and cause increased knee 
instability. He notes that he suspected that the applicant would 
need a brace and/or reconstructive surgery, because one year had 
gone by since the date of injury and he did not believe that time 
alone would return the applicant to normal knee function. Once 
again, it is unclear what the applicant was doing at this 
particular time, but as of June of 1988, he got a job in Ogden, 
Utah at Goodyear, acting as the Assistant Manager there for about 
one year. 
Sometime in the latter half of 1989, the applicant moved to 
Colorado and initially worked at Bailey Tire for an unspecified 
period of time. He then got a job with Metric Automotive and 
worked there until August of 1992. However, in January of 1992, 
the applicant had an aggravating incident to his right knee. The 
applicant testified that on January 27, 1992, he was getting out of 
his car, in his inclining driveway, when his right foot slipped on 
some ice on the ground and he fell to the ground. The applicant 
stated that he feels that the right knee instability that he had 
been having since 1987 contributed to the fall. He apparently went 
to see Dr. P. Sillix, D.O., on the same day, and he completed a 
form there which indicates that his injury was "slipped on ice 
running." At hearing, the applicant tesified that he did sign the 
form in the medical record exhibit and did complete the form. He 
admits writing "slipped on ice" but he denies that he wrote 
"running" on the form. The applicant testified that he never did 
see Dr. Sillix, because he was called away to the hospital. 
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The applicant testified that he called the adjustor some 
time after his fall and told her that he had reinjured the knee. 
He testified that the adjustor gave him permission to see Dr. D. 
Mayer, a physician associated with Grand- Junction Orthopedic 
Associates, in Grand Junction, Colorado. The applicant saw Dr. 
Mayer on March 4, 1992. Dr. Mayer/s office note of that date 
indicates that the applicant had been having persistent problems 
with the right knee since the 1987 injury. He notes that the 
applicant had persistent pain with any activity and that he fell 
down with pain any time he did a pivotal shift. He noted that this 
had occurred one week ago and that the applicant had s^n Dr. 
Sillix as a result (perhaps meaning one month ago). Dr. Mayer 
diagnosed an anterior cruciate insufficient right knee with 
probable stretched out anterior cruciate ligament which was 
essentially non-functional. He noted that he planned arthroscopic 
surgery with a partial medial menisectomy and reconstruction of the 
anterior cruciate ligament, if it was significiantly stretched out. 
Despite these plans, he completed a "work capacity/disability 
report" on March 5, 1992 and he found that the applicant could 
return to work without restrictions at that time. The applicant 
tesitified that when he notified the adjustor regarding Dr. Mayer's 
recommendations, he was initially told that further details would 
be necessary. However, he stated that he was later told that the 
surgery would not be authorized. The applicant stated that he 
could not afford the time off for the surgery at that time if he 
could not get compensation (Dr. Mayer had told him that there would 
be a year of rehabilitation after the surgery) and thus he decided 
not to pursue the surgery. 
The applicant continued to work at Metric Automotive until 
August of 1992 and then he testified that he painted cars for the 
owner of Metric Automotive through October of 1992. He stated that 
he was on a vacation to Utah during November of 1992, and then 
returned to Colorado and worked for Hot Automotive as a 
mechanic/painter during December 1992. In January of 1993, he was 
again in Utah for a vacation and he stated that he saw an attorney 
regarding the knee surgery at that time. The applicant filed his 
application for hearing in May of 1993 and in October of 1993 he 
was seen by Dr. G. Zeluff, an orthopedist, at the request of the 
adjustor. At that point, Dr. Zeluff had most of the applicant's 
medical records for review, but did not have Dr. C. Bean's records. 
On examination of the applicant, Dr. Zeluff noted that the 
applicant definitely appeared to have an anterior cruciate ligament 
insufficiency and some ^ continuing damage.to the medical meniscus. 
He noted that "this" -'could be synovial swelling in the medial 
compartment of the knee. Dr. Zeluff noted that Dr. Bean's apparent 
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findings conflicted with Dr. Gabbert's, in that Dr. Bean apparently 
diagnosed an anterior cruciate problem shortly after the April 1987 
industrial fall, while Dr. Gabbert found no problem with the 
anterior cruciate on arthroscopy. Dr. Zeluff explains that an 
anterior cruciate ligament can look normal on arthroscopic 
examination when in fact it is unstable. He concluded that, 
without Dr. Bean's records, and relying on Dr. Gabbert7s findings, 
he would have to say that the applicant had a normal anterior 
cruciate ligament after the April 1987 fall, with the more recent 
findings of insufficiency in that ligament being the result of one 
of the later twisting injuries to the knee, like the fallron the 
ice in January of 1992. 
Dr. Zeluff was later supplied with the records of Dr. Bean. 
He did an addendum report to clarify his conclusions after 
reviewing the records. That clarification report is dated December 
30, 1993. In that report, Dr. Zeluff notes that Dr. Bean felt 
there was an anterior cruciate tear, OR partial tear, at the time 
of his examination. Dr. Zeluff explains that partial tears are 
very hard to diagnose from testing or arthroscopic surgery. Based 
on this new information, Dr. Zeluff revised his conclusion to state 
that he felt there was a strong possibility that there was a 
partial tear to the anterior cruciate ligament in May of 1987, when 
Dr. Bean examined the applicant. However, Dr. Zeluff's ultimate 
conclusion was that the additional twisting injuries that the 
applicant suffered after the April 1987 fall, especially the fall 
on the ice in January of 1992, aggravated the tear and completed 
it. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Three-Year Statute of Limitations; 
The defendants' first defense is that the applicant's claim 
for additional medical expenses related to the proposed surgery is 
barred by the statutory provision specifying a three-year statute 
of limitations for medical expenses. This three-year limitation 
was first specified in U.C.A. 35-1-99(2) as it was amended in 1988. 
That provision is now located in U.C.A. 35-1-98(1), as it was 
amended in 1990, and reads in pertinent part as follows: 
00J59 
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an employee's medical benefit entitlement 
ceases if the employee does not incur medical 
expenses reasonably related to the industrial 
accident and submit those expenses to his employer 
or insurance carrier for payment, for a period of 
three consecutive years. 
The ALJ finds that if that statutory provision was in effect at the 
date of the applicant's injury, it would probably bar the applicant 
from any claim for additional expenses after 1991. However, that 
provision was not in effect on April 23, 1987, having first become 
effective in 1988. Applying the well established principal that it 
is the law on the date of injury that applies', the ALJ finds that 
the above-cited provision does not apply to the applicant's claim, 
because it was passed and became effective after the applicant had 
his April 23, 1987 industrial injury. The ALJ must therefore 
dismiss the defendants' first defense. 
Subsequent Accident Compensability: 
The defendants argue that the cause of the most recent 
recommendation for surgery is the January 27, 1992 non-industrial 
fall and not the April 23, 1987 industrial accident (per Dr. 
Zeluf f) . The applicant claims that the cause of the most recent 
recommendation for surgery is the April 23, 1987 industrial 
accident, as it was noted as early as March of 1988 that the 
surgery would be needed eventually as treatment for the industrial 
accident (per Dr. Janeway) . The conclusions of Dr. Zeluff and Dr. 
Janeway could be seen as controverting opinions, warranting a 
referral to a medical panel for addtional input. However, Dr. 
Janeway is unaware of the January 27, 1992 accident and it is 
unclear whether he would feel that this subsequent accident 
aggravated the anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) injury. Therefore, 
it is not clear that there is any controversy regarding whether an 
aggravation occurred in January of 1992. This makes the need of 
additional medical input less clear. In addition, claifying 
whether or not an aggravation did occur appears to be unnecessary. 
This is true because the ALJ finds that, even presuming that the 
1992 fall aggravated the injury caused by the April 1987 industrial 
fall, the effects of that aggravation are compensable. 
Professor Larson nas stated tne rule on compensability of 
subsequent accidents to be as follows: 
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When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out 
of and in the course of employment, every natural 
consequence that flows from the injury likewise 
arises out of the employment, unless it is the 
result of an independent intervening cause 
attributable to the claimant's own intentional 
conduct* 
A* Larson, Workmen's Compensation, §13.00 (Desk Ed. 1988}. In 
discussing complications that follow the initial or primary injury, 
Larson cites a Utah case, Perchelli v, Utah State Indus, Comm'n, 
475 P.2d 835 (Utah 1970), in which it was determined that a sneeze 
following an industrial back injury (which sneeze caused the need 
for surgery to the back) was compensable. Larson states: 
The case should be no different if the triggering 
epidsode is some nonemployment exertion like 
raising a window or hanging up a suit, so long as 
it is clear that the real operative factor is the 
progression of the compensble injury, associated 
with an exertion that in itself would not be 
unreasonable in the circumstances. 
A. Larson, supra, §13.11(a). Larson also notes a category of 
subsequent injuries that he refers to as "weakened member 
contributing to later fall or other injury.11 Id. §13.12. Larson 
states: 
Where the question of intervening cause has arisen 
in the category of cases covered by this 
subsection, it has usually been held that the 
claimant's negligent act broke the chain of 
causation. ... As to what constitutes negligence, 
in these cases it often takes the form of rashly 
undertaking a line of action with knowledge of the 
risk created by the weakened member. 
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In addition to the discussion by Larson regarding subsequent 
accident compensability, there is just one Utah case that is 
particularly on point. That case is Mountain States Casing v. 
McKean, 706 P.2d 601 (Utah 1985) and involved a work injury causing 
loss of sensation in the hand, which the injured worker later 
burned severely, partially because the loss of sensation prevented 
him from.feeling the burn. The Court in that case states: 
A subseqent injury is compensable if it is found to* 
be a natural result of a compensable primary* 
injury. McKean is not required to show that his 
original tragedy was the sole cause of a subsequent 
injury, but only that the initial 'work-related 
accident was a contributing cause of his subsequent 
hand injury. 
Although this seems to be more generous in finding compensability 
than the Larson rule, the Court in McKean does go on to note that 
the applicant's subsequent activity was not negligent or 
intentional, so that it appears that the Court is adopting a rule 
similar to what Larson notes as appropriate. 
Applying the above-stated "rules" to the instant facts, it 
would appear that if the applicant was merely getting out of the 
car when his right leg gave way, partially due to the ice and 
partially due to the longstanding effects of the 1987 injury to the 
ACL, any resulting aggravation to the ACL caused by the fall that 
followed would be compensable. This would be true, because getting 
out of the car was not an unreasonable or negligent act, and 
because the inital work related accident was a contributing cause 
of the fall, that occurred after getting out of the car. On the 
other hand, if the fall occurred because the applicant was running 
on the ice, as is suggested by the form completed at Dr. Sillix's 
office, the effects of the fall could be non-compensable. This is 
because the fall might then be considered to be the result of an 
intentional and negligent act, that was a rash undertaking 
considering the fact that the applicant knew that the right leg 
occasionally gave way or locked. 
The ALJ finds that'the applicant was not running on the ice 
when the fall occurred iri January of 1992 and was actually getting 
out of the car when he/slipped on the ice and possibly aggravated 
the ACL iniury that he; incurred as a result of the industrial fall 
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at issue on April 23, 1987. The ALJ makes this conclusion because 
the form from Dr. Sillix's office contains the only reference to 
running on the ice that has been submitted and there is no other 
confirmation that the applicant was running on the ice when he fell 
in 1992. The applicant testified that he was getting out of the 
car in his driveway when he fell on the ice and he denies that he 
was running on the ice when the fall occurred. The defendants have 
not argued strenuously that the fall occurred while the applicant 
was running and have offered no evidence that would confirm that 
the applicant was running when he fell. In addition, the 
defendants presented written argument regarding the compensability 
of the fall in a post-hearing letter which is based on the 
applicant falling after getting out of the car. 
Because the ALJ finds that the applicant fell on January 27, 
1992 after getting out of his car, partially as a result of ice on 
the driveway and partially as a result of the effects of the April 
23, 1987 injury to the ACL (causing locking and giving way of the 
knee) , the ALJ finds that any aggravation to the right knee caused 
by the January 1992 fall is compensable as a "natural consequence" 
flowing from the April 23, 1987 fall. This conclusion is based 
upon the discussion regarding subsequent injuries in Professor 
Larson's treatise and the adoption of the Larson rule by the Utah 
Supreme Court, as noted in the McKean case cited above. The ALJ 
should point out that she makes no ruling regarding whether or not 
an actual aggravation to the knee occurred on January 27, 1992. 
The ALJ simply finds that even if one did occur, it does not break 
the chain of causation between the April 23, 1987 fall and the 
current recommendation for surgery. Dr. Janeway did note as early 
as March of 1988 that the need for reconstructive surgery was 
anticipated at that point and that the ACL would continue to 
stretch with additional instability in the knee occurring simply as 
a result of the passage of time. Certainly, one legitimate 
interpretation of the medical records in this case is that, per Dr. 
Janeway's prediction, the ACL simply worsened with time and now 
requires surgery. However, as noted above, even if a subsequent 
aggravation (in January of 1992) is causing the need for the now-
recommended surgery, that aggravation is compensable. 
Based on the foregoing conclusions, the defendants should 
pay for the reconstructive surgery to the right knee that is 
currently recommended and should pay the applicant temporary total 
compensation (TTC) during his recovery from the surgery. The 
defendants should withhold 20% of the applicant's TTC for payment 
to the applicant's attorney once the applicant has stabilized. 
EXHIBIT C, PAGE ELEVEN on >£2 
ORDER 
RE: DAVID WARDROP 
PAGE 12 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Brown & Root 
Industrial Service/Highlands Insurance (Black, Nicols & Guiver -
Adjuster), pay the applicant, David Wardrop, temporary total 
compensation during the period of his medical instability following 
the reconstructive surgery to the right knee that will be performed 
at a future date* 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Brown & Root 
Industrial Service/Highlands Insurance (Black, Nicols & Guiver -
Adjustor), pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of the 
April 23, 1987 industrial accident, including those expenses 
related to the reconstructive surgery to the right knee that will 
be performed at a future date; said expenses to be paid in 
accordance with the medical and surgical fee schedule of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Brown & Root 
Industrial Service/Highlands Insurance (Black, Nicols & Guiver -
Adjustor), pay G. Scott Jensen, attorney for the applicant, 
attorney fees witheld from the applicant's temporary total 
compensation to be paid in the future, in an amount consistent with 
the Commission rule R568-1-7, for services rendered in this matter, 
the same to be paid in a lump sum at the time that the applicant 
stabilizes. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the 
date of filing with the Commission, in which, to file a written 
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-
12(2) Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED this Q day of March, 1994. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
EXHIBIT D; 
DECISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 93-0561 
Brown & Root Industrial Service and its insurance carrier, 
Highland Insurance (referred to jointly hereafter as "Brown & 
Root") ask The Industrial Commission of Utah to review an 
Administrative Law Judge's Order awarding medical expenses and 
temporary total disability compensation to David Wardrop in 
connection with anticipated surgery to Mr, Wardrop's right knee. 
The Commission exercises jurisdiction over this Motion For 
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the very thorough findings of fact set 
forth in the ALJ's decision. Those facts are summarized below as 
background for the Commission7s decision. 
On April 23, 1987, in the cdurse of his employment by Brown & 
Root, Mr. Wardrop fell and injured his rxght knee. Although his 
knee hurt, he continued to work. Ten days later, again in the 
course of employment at Brown & Root, his right knee "locked" on 
him. He was first examined a Dr. Taylor and diagnosed with "knee 
strain." Three weeks later, Dr. Bean, an orthopedist, diagnosed a 
torn medial meniscus and damage to the anterior cruciate ligament. 
Brown & Root authorized Dr. Gabbert to perform arthroscopic 
surgery on Mr. Wardrop's knee. During the surgery, Dr. Gabbert 
observed no tears in either the medial meniscus or anterior 
cruciate ligament. During subsequent examinations, Dr. Gabbert 
noted that Mr. Wardrop continued to experience subjective 
discomfort in the knee, but suffered no objective problems. 
In October 1987, Brown & Root authorized Dr. Janeway, also an 
orthopedist, to examine Mr. Wardrop. Dr. Janeway diagnosed Mr* 
Wardrop as suffering from disruption of the anterior cruciate 
ligament, associated with his work-related injury. Then, during 
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March 1988, Dr. Janeway noted that Mr. Wardrop continued to suffer 
pain in the knee, attributable to the damaged anterior cruciate 
ligament. Dr. Janeway advised Brown & Root that a brace and/or 
surgery would be required to correct the problem. Mr. Wardrop did 
not pursue the matter further for the next several years. 
On January 27, 1992, as he was stepping out of his car, Mr. 
Wardrop's right foot slipped on ice, causing him to fall to the 
ground. Brown and Root authorized an orthopedic examination by Dr. 
Mayer, who diagnosed a probable stretched anterior cruciate 
ligament and concluded that arthroscopic surgery was necessary. 
Brown & Root declined liability for the anticipated surgery 
and related period of temporary total disability. In response, Mr. 
Wardrop filed an Application For Hearing. Brown and Root then 
arranged for Dr. Zeluff, an orthopedist, to examine Mr. Wardrop. 
Dr. Zeluff..-found "a strong possibility" that Mr. Wardrop had 
suffered an injury to the anterior cruciate ligament of his right 
knee as a result of his accident at Brown & Root in 1987, which 
injury was then aggravated by Mr. Wardrop's fall on the ice in 
1992. 
Based on the foregoing facts, the ALJ concluded that Brown & 
Root was liable for the anticipated arthroscopic surgery on Mr. 
Wardrop's right knee, as well as temporary total disability 
benefits during the time required for healing. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Brown & Root's Motion For Review contends that the ALJ erred 
in: 1) concluding that Mr. Wardrop's current knee injury was 
caused by the 1987 industrial accident; 2) declining to refer the 
matter to a medical panel; 3) limiting Brown & Root's inquiry into 
Mr. Wardrop's criminal record; and 4) concluding that a three year 
statute of limitations adopted in 1988 is inapplicable to this 1987 
accident. Each of Root & Brown's contentions is discussed below. 
No one disputes Mr. Waldrop's need for surgery to correct the 
damaged anterior cruciate ligament of his right knee. The only 
dispute is whether Mr. Waldrop's knee injury is the result of his 
1987 industrial accident and therefore compensable under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act. 
Having reviewed the record, the Commission finds the various 
medical opinions to be in substantial agreement that Mr. Waldrop'js 
industrial injury of 1987 is the genesis of his current problem. 
The Commission therefore affirms the ALJ's conclusion that Mr.-
Waldrop is entitled to''payment
 %of medical expenses necessary ro 
treat his current knee problem, as well as associated temporary 
disability compensation. 
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Brown & Root also argues the ALJ should have referred the 
medical aspects of this case to a medical panel. The Commission's 
Rule R568-1-9.A. governs the use of medical panels; 
A panel will be utilized . . ..where: 
1) One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. . . . 
As previously noted, the various medical opinions in this case 
are in substantial agreement and do not present any significant 
medical issue. The Commission therefore affirms the ALJ's 
conclusion that a medical panel is not warranted. 
Next, Brown & Root contends the ALJ improperly limited its 
questioning of Mr. Wardrop on the subject of his criminal record. 
Under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609, such examination is 
permitted only if the crime in question was of serious magnitude or 
involves dishonesty or false statement. From the record provided 
to it, the Commission cannot conclude that Mr. Wardrop's alleged 
criminal record meets this test of admissibility. Furthermore, 
such evidence would be of limited probative value given the 
objective facts of this case. The Commission therefore affirms the 
ALJ's decision on this point. 
Finally, Brown & Root argues the ALJ erred in rejecting its 
statute of limitations defense. In particular, Brown & Root points 
to Section 35-1-98(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act, which 
provides: 
. . . an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if 
the employee does not incur medical expenses reasonably 
related to the industrial accident, and submit those 
expenses to his employer or insurance carrier for 
payment, for a period of three consecutive years. 
As noted by the ALJ, had this provision been in effect at the 
time of Mr. Wardrop's 1987 accident, it might well bar him from 
pursuing his claim, since more than three years has elapsed since 
he last submitted medical expenses to Brown & Root. However, as 
also noted by the ALJ, it is well settled that the law in effect at 
the time of the accident governs the substantive rights of the 
parties in a workers' compensation claim. Kennecott v. Industrial 
Comm. , 740 P.2d 305, 307 (Utah App 1987) Applying the principle of 
Kennecott to this case, Mr. Wardrop's claim is not subject to the 
three year statute of limitations added to the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act in 1988. 
00088 




Based on the foregoing, the Commission affirms the decision of 
the Administrative Law Judge and dismisses Brown & Root's Motion 
For Review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this M day of September, 1994. 
^LvQ^x,. 
S t e p h e n M. Had]^ey 
Chaiito&n 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
£4*3-Colleeif S. Colton 
Commissioner 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order by filing a Petition For Review with the Court of 
Appeals within 3 0 days of the date of this Order. 
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BROWN & ROOT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 93-561 
DAVID WARDROP, 
Applicant, 
DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR REVIEW 
BROWN & ROOT INDUSTRIAL 
SERVICE/HIGHLANDS INSURANCE 
(Black, Nichols & Guiver, 
Adjustor), 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to the provisions of §35-1-82.53 of the Utah Code, 
defendants move the Commission for its review of Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order herein dated March 17, 1994, 
as follows: 
FACTS 
The basic facts describing this proceeding and the evidence 
presented is substantially outlined in the Findings of Fact 
issued by the Administrative Law Judge herein and, thus, will not 
be restated here. The proper application of the facts as 
contained in the record will be referenced in the argument set 
forth below. 
ARGUMENT 
The industrial accident which occurred on April 23, 1987, 
while the applicant was working for Brown & Root, simply 
consisted of his slipping back into a hole out of which the 
applicant was climbing and allegedly feeling some pain in his 
n A 
right knee. As shown by the medical records, he did not "seelc' 
treatment for his knee until some 11 days later when t$i fcf^y 4, 
1987, he went to the Tanner Clinic. There his knee wak Grayed, 
and he was returned to work. Then some three-plus weeks 
thereafter, he went on his own to see Dr. Bean who recommended 
arthroscopic examination in order to determine the extent of 
injury. Inspection of ligaments and the lateral and medial 
meniscus was performed by arthroscopic examination by Dr. Sabbert 
on July 14, 1987. He found the ligaments intact and no tears in 
either the lateral or medial meniscus. No pathology was found. 
Followup reports of Dr. Gabbert reported normal walking, no 
swelling nor ligamentous instability, full range of motion and 
good quad function, and no anticipated permanent impairment. 
Although the applicant did consult with Dr. Janeway in October 
1987, and March 1988, it is not known that Dr. Janeway was 
provided with the prior records of Dr. Gabbert in order to 
confirm or dispute Dr. Gabbertfs findings. In any event, the 
applicant did, over the next several years, work for different 
employers in jobs requiring the active use of his right knee, and 
he did so without the need for any additional medical treatment 
nor any reported impairment with respect to his work activity or 
other lifefs activities. (See Affidavit of Darin Carei [Exhibit 
D-3].) Thus, the evidence presented requires one to conclude 
that the industrial accident of April 23, 1987, was not severe, 
was adequately treated and that no pathology resulted as was 
2 
~ r\ *A/C^ 
determined by a visual inspection of the knee made* pursuant to 
arthroscopic examination. 
It was not until after the applicant sustained a*3 
nonindustrial injury to his right knee on January 27, 1992, that 
additional treatment and surgery on the knee was prescribed. On 
that date, while stepping out of his car upon a sloping, ice-
covered cement driveway, the applicant's foot slipped out from 
under him causing the leg to extend out from underneath hi& and 
causing him to fall to the ground- There is no question but what 
said accident was severe in its trauma and that it caused 
substantial injury to the knee. The applicant testified that at 
the time of said accident, he felt a popping and experienced 
severe pain in the knee. He further testified that substantial 
swelling ensued which required him to pack his knee with ice for 
a period of about ten hours. Thus, both the accident and the 
injury which occurred on 1/27/92 can, based upon the evidence 
presented, only be found to be both substantial and independent 
of the applicant's prior knee injury which had occurred almost 
five years before. It is submitted that there is no substantial 
evidence in the record from which one can conclude that the 
applicant's foot slipped out from under him on the icy driveway 
because of any weakness attributable to the prior industrial 
accident. The applicant's foot slipped on the ice because of the 
ice—not because of any weakness in the knee. The applicant has 
produced no substantial evidence to prove otherwise. He 
3 
certainly has not produced a preponderance of evidence"#onn that 
fact, which is his burden. •;•
 #\ 
Defendants have no quarrel with the principle citkd'tfy the 
Administrative Law Judge in citing Larson. Note, however, that 
Larson finds compensable "every natural consequence that flows 
from the injury..," It can hardly be said that the applicant's 
slipping and falling on an icy cement driveway was the "natural 
consequence" of his prior industrial injury. It is also 
instructive that Larson indicates that the triggering occurrence 
may be found to be compensable "so long as it is clear that the 
real operative factor is the progression of the compensable 
injury." In this case, it is far from "clear" that the injury 
which the applicant sustained in January 1992, is "the 
progression of the compensable injury." 
It would appear that the Administrative Law Judge has become 
distracted in her analysis of the facts of this case as it 
relates to the law cited by Larson. In the instant case, it is 
irrelevant as to whether or not the applicant's slipping on the 
ice in January 1992, was a negligent or intentional act since the 
relevant focus should not be upon the nature of the act but 
rather the cause of the occurrence. In this case, there is no 
substantial evidence that the applicant's slipping on the ice was 
in any way caused by industrial injury which occurred in 1987^ 
It is submitted that the Administrative Law Judge also erred 
in failing to refer this matter to a medical panel for a 
4 
determination of the medical issues. Since the arthrb^ctfpic#* 
examination of the applicant's knee in 1987 revealed *>o### 
pathology," then it cannot be assumed that any pathology*Existed. 
The mere fact that Dr. Zeluff, who examined applicant in 1993, 
speculated that there was a "strong possibility" that there was a 
partial tear of the anterior cruciate ligament in May 1987, does 
not satisfy the applicant's burden of proof to the effect that 
there was. The preponderance of the evidence is that there was 
no pathology to the applicant's anterior cruciate ligament as 
determined by the visual inspection of Dr. Gabbert in 1987. Any 
opinion to the contrary is, in fact, speculative. It is 
certainly beyond the expertise of the Administrative Law Judge to 
resolve that medical question. 
It is instructive that the Administrative Law Judge refuses 
to make a finding with respect to whether or not the injury of 
1992 was an "actual aggravation" of a pre-existing condition 
since there is no substantial evidence to support such a finding. 
There is, on the other hand, a clear demonstration by the 
evidence that the 1992 accident caused a new and different injury 
and that this new injury is what creates the need for the 
prescribed surgery. 
The primary object of the application in this proceeding is 
to require the defendants to pay for the prescribed surgery. The 
evidence taken as a whole does not preponderate in favor of a 
finding that the surgery is necessitated because of an industrial 
5 
• • • « « « ' - - -
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accident in 1987, On the other hand, it strongly preponderates 
in favor of a finding that applicant's accident in Jaijnayry 1992, 
was the event that requires the prospective surgery, •lTh#a# 
prospective surgery is for the purpose of repairing a torn 
anterior cruciate ligament and a torn medial meniscus. None of 
that pathology can be demonstrated to have occurred as a result 
of the 1987 industrial accident. It was clearly the result of 
the 1992 accident. There is no definitive evidence that the 
prescribed surgery would have been necessary had it not been for 
the 1992 accident. 
It is submitted that the Administrative Law Judge also erred 
in refusing to allow the defendants to pursue inquiry at the 
hearing concerning the applicant's criminal record. To the 
extent that the Administrative Law Judge relied upon the 
testimony of the applicant, then his credibility is at issue and 
his criminal record is a relevant matter for consideration in 
that regard. During the course of the hearing, the defendants 
demonstrated that the applicant had been twice convicted of a 
crime; but the applicants objection to further examination on 
his further criminal record was sustained, and the defendants 
were precluded from making a record on his criminal background. 
It is also submitted that the Administrative Law Judge erred 
in ruling that the three-year statute of limitations relating to 
medical care does not bar the applicant's claim for additional 
medical expenses. Since the thrfee-year statute of limitations 
6 
• • • • 
became effective on July 1, 1988, and the applicant drd not incur* 
and submit for payment any further medical expenses for a period 
• • • 
of at least three years thereafter, the limitation wqijjcf.apply to 
the instant case if it is determined that the statute is 
procedural in nature. If so, it is applicable to all industrial 
accidents whether those accidents occurred before or after the 
enactment of the statute unless some prejudice can be 
demonstrated. The Supreme Court has ruled that statutes af 
limitations are procedural in nature and, therefore, can be 
applied retroactively. Certainly, in this case, the applicant 
should be treated no differently because his industrial accident 
occurred in 1987 as opposed to someone whose industrial accident 
occurred after July 1, 1988. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, it is submitted that the 
Order requiring the defendants to pay for the applicant's 
prescribed surgery is in error, is not based upon a preponderance 
of evidence, and should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \^ day of April, 1994. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MftRTINEAU 
-B2L C u ^ y v \ /JJkXu, 
Stuart L. Poelman 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Gloriann Egan being duly sworn, says that she is employed by 
the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
defendants Brown & Root and Highlands Insurance herein; that she 
served the attached DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR REVIEW (Case Number 
93-561, Utah State Industrial Commission) upon the parties listed 
below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
G. Scott Jensen, Esq. 
205 26th Street #34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the /3 day of April, 1994. 
Gloriann Egan 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /3^day of April, 
1994. 
'1/ttU^ 
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